Exploring the Role of Relational Practices in Water
Governance Using a Game-Based Approach by Magnuszewski, Piotr et al.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Papers in Natural Resources Natural Resources, School of
2018
Exploring the Role of Relational Practices in Water
Governance Using a Game-Based Approach
Piotr Magnuszewski
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, piotr.magnuszewski@gmail.com
Karolina Krolikowska
Centre for Systems Solutions, karokrolikowska@gmail.com
Anna Koch
Centre for Systems Solutions, anna.koch@crs.org.pl
Michal Pajak
Centre for Systems Solutions, michal.pajak@crs.org.pl
Craig R. Allen
University of Nebraska - Lincoln, callen3@unl.edu
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/natrespapers
Part of the Natural Resources and Conservation Commons, Natural Resources Management and
Policy Commons, and the Other Environmental Sciences Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Natural Resources, School of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Papers in Natural Resources by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Magnuszewski, Piotr; Krolikowska, Karolina; Koch, Anna; Pajak, Michal; Allen, Craig R.; Chraibi, Victoria; Giri, Anil; Haak, Danielle;
Hart, Noelle; Hellman, Michelle; Pan, Donald; Rossman, Nathan; Sendzimir, Jan; Sliwinski, Maggi S.; Stefanska, Joanna; Taillieu,
Tharsi; Weide, Denise Marie; and Zlatar, Ilonka, "Exploring the Role of Relational Practices in Water Governance Using a Game-Based
Approach" (2018). Papers in Natural Resources. 786.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/natrespapers/786
Authors
Piotr Magnuszewski, Karolina Krolikowska, Anna Koch, Michal Pajak, Craig R. Allen, Victoria Chraibi, Anil
Giri, Danielle Haak, Noelle Hart, Michelle Hellman, Donald Pan, Nathan Rossman, Jan Sendzimir, Maggi S.
Sliwinski, Joanna Stefanska, Tharsi Taillieu, Denise Marie Weide, and Ilonka Zlatar
This article is available at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/natrespapers/786
water
Article
Exploring the Role of Relational Practices in Water
Governance Using a Game-Based Approach
Piotr Magnuszewski 1,2,*, Karolina Królikowska 2,3, Anna Koch 2 ID , Michal Pająk 2,4,
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Abstract: The growing complexity and interdependence of water management processes requires the
involvement of multiple stakeholders in water governance. Multi-party collaboration is increasingly
vital at both the strategy development and implementation levels. Multi-party collaboration involves
a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders in a problem domain directed towards
the future of that domain. However, the common goal is not present from the beginning; rather,
the common goal emerges during the process of collaboration. Unfortunately, when the conflicting
interests of different actors are at stake, the large majority of environmental multi-party efforts often
do not reliably deliver sustainable improvements to policy and/or practice. One of the reasons for
this, which has been long established by many case studies, is that social learning with a focus on
relational practices is missing. The purpose of this paper is to present the design and initial results of
a pilot study that utilized a game-based approach to explore the effects of relational practices on the
effectiveness of water governance. This paper verifies the methods used by addressing the following
question: are game mechanisms, protocols for facilitation and observation, the recording of decisions
and results, and participant surveys adequate to reliably test hypotheses about behavioral decisions
related to water governance? We used the “Lords of the Valley” (LOV) game, which focuses on the
local-level management of a hypothetical river valley involving many stakeholders. We used an
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Water 2018, 10, 346 2 of 27
observation protocol to collect data on the quality of relational practices and compared this data
with the quantitative outcomes achieved by participants in the game. In this pilot study, we ran the
game three times with different groups of participants, and here we provide the outcomes within the
context of verifying and improving the methods.
Keywords: serious games; social simulation; social learning; relational practices; river basin
management; water governance; multi-party collaboration; stakeholders; experimental social research
1. Introduction
Water governance involves many complex issues beyond the conventional scope of technical
and environmental aspects. Water catchments can be characterized by connectedness, complexity,
uncertainty, conflict, multiple stakeholders, and multiple perspectives [1]. Berg [2] identifies seven
crucial elements that affect water governance: institutions, interests of stakeholders, information,
incentives, ideas, ideals (i.e., priorities placed on objectives), and individuals (meaning leadership).
In order to integrate all these aspects in water governance, traditional top-down and technocratic
approaches must be replaced by new management paradigms [3]. By this account, collaborative or
participatory and multi-scale or multi-level modes of governance have been widely recommended to
reconcile environmental, economic, and societal goals in the water sector [4–7].
Crucial factors for successful collaborative governance include face-to-face dialogue,
trust building, commitment, and development of a shared understanding [8]. Dialogue enhances
stakeholder empowerment and network building, and fosters learning [9]. Previous studies have
found that learning processes based on social relations are essential for sustainable water resources
management [10–12] since they provide positive outcomes, providing an increased understanding
of key issues, reframing, building trust, improving relations, developing new organizations,
and producing substantive results [13]. These outcomes of social learning may be both technical
(e.g., effectiveness, sustainability, and integration) and relational or normative, such as a sense
of ownership of solutions by different stakeholders, active citizenship, inclusive governance,
and self-governing capacities [14]. Social learning occurs in multi-party collaboration processes
that take place in the actors’ networks or in “communities of practice” [3]. Multi-party collaboration
is an emerging work system of two or more legally independent parties formed to address a certain
problem while still retaining their autonomy within the new entity, e.g., network.
Multi-party collaboration involves a process of joint decision-making among key stakeholders
in a problem domain directed towards the future of that domain. However, the common goal is
not apparent from the beginning but rather is created through a process of collaboration [14,15].
According to the relational theory of multi-party collaboration processes, organizing can be defined as
the process of making new meaning from the given diverse inputs while building communities
of practice, and relational practices constitute the core of the social learning process (Figure 1).
Relational activities (we use term interchangeably with relational practices in this paper) include
getting the attention of stakeholders, committing to collaborate, legitimating stakeholders, fostering
dialogue, connecting stakes and interests, negotiating roles and identities, guaranteeing commitment
of constituencies, and aligning efforts and agreements [14]. They are often neglected at the expense
of the focus on technical problem-solving. All too often such neglect of relational practices turns out
to be highly detrimental to the outcomes. Social learning for interdependence among the parties is
regarded as a central aim of multi-party collaboration, of which the main goal is to acknowledge and
accommodate interdependent interests through the process of continuous negotiations. Unfortunately,
most multi-party projects do not reliably develop improvements in policy or practice [14]. This might
be caused by stakeholder assumptions about intended outcomes. Quaghebeur et al. [16] document that
the emerging participation may be very different from what the convening party originally intended or
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what the financing institution expected. A greater challenge arises in regard to framing and reframing
issues, e.g., when different actors, by definition, take different perspectives on issues. This is often
the core problem in interdisciplinary projects related to natural resources [17]. Difficulties in creating
co-ownership of the solution among all parties may occur even if the interactions among the parties
are very intensive and well-guided [18].
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When conflicting interests of different actors are at stake in environmental projects, social learning
that is centered on relational practices may prove to be crucial in overcoming these problems.
Water management can serve as a perfect reflection of multi-party collaboration issues. Water itself
might be perceived as a strong metaphor for the interconnectedness among many stakeholders
since it connects geographical regions and diverse groups of providers and users, and as such
symbolizes ecological and social interdependencies [14]. The purpose of this paper is to consider the
abovementioned issues within the context of a multi-party collaboration experiment based on a serious
game devoted to the challenges of water management in a river valley.
Environmental management games have long been used to support learning and to promote
awareness of sustainability challenges [19] in a broad range of policy domains, such as climate
change mitigation and adaptation [20,21], flood risk management [22–24], and land use and urban
planning [25]. Environmental management games have been used both at different levels of education
systems as well as in public policy to support social learning and encourage collective action [26–28].
Educational uses of serious games are further expanded into support for participatory policy analysis
and strategic management [29,30], and it has been found that almost one-quarter of these games relate
to water governance [31]. According to Mayer [32], the success of gaming for policymaking derives
from the power of gaming to tackle both the technical-physical and the social-political complexities of
policy problems.
Parallel to gaming applications in education and policy making, serious games have also been
used to support experimental research. The application of laboratory experiments in the social and
political sciences has continued to increase since the 1980s; however, there are still many objections
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regarding the lack of realism and generalizability. However, Falk and Heckman [33] argue that many of
these objections are misguided, and laboratory experiments provide the possibility to control variation,
which is basic for empirical scientific knowledge. According to these authors, such experiments,
including games, can be used to study behaviors and institutions under the conditions of strong
control of decision environments (e.g., payoffs, information that parties possess, and rules of action).
There is an established tradition of experiments in the field of experimental economics regarding
policy-relevant issues, such as cooperation and public goods [34] or the importance of reciprocity and
social approval [33,35]. Progress in experimental games has been achieved by evoking the essence of
complex dilemmas in simple settings, though it leaves many questions about social processes in more
realistic policy situations untouched.
Regarding complex policy questions, games seem to be a research method with potentially
high external validity, especially when it is not possible (or very difficult) to test alternative policies
in real-life situations. Games may be designed in a manner that is less artificial than laboratory
experiments, and thus, they may more adequately depict real-life scenarios [36]. Empirical studies in
the organization and policy sciences might have a form of “research with gaming” [30] or “gaming for
pure research” [36], i.e., when games are used as an observation context to develop and test hypotheses
on the policy-relevant behavior of individuals, groups, and organizations. The strongest advantage of
games as quasi-experiments relates to the controlled variation that is crucial for causal knowledge [37].
Games provide the possibility of systematically manipulating variables in complex organizational
environments and measuring the effects in systematic ways, including statistical methods, even in
mostly qualitative projects [36]. The analysis of available experiments with games provided several
conclusions on the advantages of “research with gaming” [30,36]:
• identical policy environments for experimental and control groups, though the stimuli for all
groups can be structured in a controlled and desired way;
• the possibility of complete observation and reconstruction (by writing down all actions
in observation protocols) of all decision-making processes, which is hard to achieve in
real-life situations;
• opportunities to observe situations (raised by simulations) that are rare, hidden, risky, and socially
unacceptable or in other ways that are difficult to access in reality.
Questionable correspondence between the experimental environment and reality can be checked
among participants [30,36], who should include experienced policy makers (strongly recommended),
not just students. This “member check” provides a serious opportunity to assess the psychological and
procedural validity of the game. However, there will always be difficult-to-avoid trade-offs between
the control of experimental conditions and the real-life resemblance of experimental environments.
Furthermore, a trade-off exists between representing real-life experiences and playability since
participants often undertake certain actions within a game in order to “have fun” that they would
not initiate in the real world. Next, an issue that always arises with social research is the effect of
the observer’s presence on participants’ behavior. However, the same problem occurs in interviews,
so this problem is not exclusive to gaming research.
The LOV game has been used repeatedly as an educational serious environmental management
game. Because it is based on a real-world situation in the Tisza River Valley of Hungary [38], it also has
the potential to serve as an experimental environment for research in the field of water governance [22].
With a more complex representation than experimental economic games, LOV allows researchers
to examine the social interactions that emerge from the role-playing situation linked with causal
mechanisms from the environment. The main outcome from this paper is the verification of the
methods used by addressing the following question: are game mechanisms, protocols for facilitation
and observation, the recording of decisions and results, and participant surveys adequate to reliably
test hypotheses about behavioral decisions related to water governance?
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2. Materials and Methods
We developed the LOV game as a tool to support a multi-party collaboration quasi-experiment.
The original version of the game was created as a part of the NeWater project [39]. The goal was to create
a simulation, based on interviews with stakeholders and experts, which enables participants to explore
alternative river management regimes and introduces the concept of river-landscape connectivity.
After the finalization of the project, the game was further developed in cooperation with the University
of Leuven (Belgium) to expand on the existing biophysical model by introducing new roles for the
participants, thus exploring social aspects of floodplain management. The goal was to represent the
problems connected with engaging multiple stakeholders and thereby emphasize the importance of
relational activities. This development created the social simulation that is currently used regularly
in the context of educating about river basin management and social aspects of creating multi-lateral
agreements. Furthermore, it has been implemented as a supplementary tool in real-world processes
to engage participants and give them an opportunity to explore the problem, similar to the real one,
in a safe, simulated environment (for example, sessions with Dutch Water Sector Intelligence [40].
The current version of the game is available to be played online using tablets and computers for all
operations and calculations [41].
The biophysical model in the game refers to a short river reach. It is limited and does not include
any details on water quality, aquatic ecology, or groundwater. Since the game focuses on a small
community in a river valley, upstream–downstream relationships are not included. The game is not
intended to recreate biophysical complexity—rather its goal to represent a minimalistic representation
with only basic feedbacks. Even such a minimalistic representation is hard to handle for participants.
The main purpose of our quasi-experimental approach is to study the social complexity of water
governance systems. Many experimental studies follow an experimental economics approach that
limits game features to bare essentials. Adding game features has to be done carefully in order to
match the cognitive limits of participants within the assigned time (which is rarely longer than a 1-day
workshop). Hence, the scope of our biophysical model must have been limited. At the other end of the
game complexity spectrum, role-playing simulations are rarely assessed with quantitative methods.
The contribution of this study lies in bringing more structure to qualitative studies of social behavior
relevant to water governance.
We applied a “research with gaming” approach in order to examine the impact of relational
activities on the outputs in the game setting. It is not the goal of this experiment to reproduce real life
social learning, although the game itself might be used as a support for multi-stakeholder processes
(we provide some comments on such a use of this game in the discussion section). In other words,
we use the game for empirical research on complex systems in a laboratory situation.
Using the LOV game as an observational context [30], we have designed structured observation
protocols and used the record of game results to measure the impact of relational activities on the
game’s outputs. Relational activities such as leadership, sharing information, stereotyping, and ground
rules were selected for this study from the longer list based on research and training experience [42].
In this article, we report our initial results from three case studies. While it is obvious that these
results are not statistically significant, these results represent a pilot study of the research method that
allows one to explore relational activities and social learning in a controlled environment. Therefore,
the contribution of this article is methodological in nature, and there is no claim made regarding the
validity of the results. Rather, we demonstrate how this type of research can be conducted; additionally,
although the actual results in the three case studies support our hypothesis, we are aware that a larger
sample is needed to develop valid conclusions. Despite the modesty of these assumptions, we believe
the challenges inherent in the empirical research of complex social-ecological systems make this pilot
study novel and relevant to both the use of serious games for empirical research the understanding of
social processes in complex environments.
Our main research direction focuses on determining whether relational activities act as facilitating
mechanisms that affect the game’s two main outcomes: the players’ economic status and the state
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of the environment. Based on the existing research in the area of multi-party collaboration [14,15],
we propose the following hypotheses:
1. Groups that allow/stimulate all members to share information, express their understanding of
the problem, and build a shared reality are better able to cope with inherent system complexity;
thus, they achieve better content outcomes.
2. Having a leader (leaders) that is (are) both process- and outcome-oriented facilitates the
processes of defining the problem and agreeing upon solutions, which, therefore, leads to better
content outcomes.
3. Stereotyping and/or lack of ground rules to facilitate interactions make conflict management
more difficult; as a result, it lowers the chance of developing common solutions and negatively
affects content outcomes.
4. The ability of the group to formulate and agree upon a common solution leads to better
content outcomes.
We will attempt to verify these hypotheses in the subsequent research. In this article, based on the
pilot study, we will verify if the methods that we use are appropriate for testing these hypotheses. In the
LOV game, participants take the roles of inhabitants of a river valley threatened with droughts and
floods. They are asked to identify with their roles; however, no decisions are imposed on them—they
can make them freely. Some assume the roles of farmers, and their task is to manage the farms
they own. They make decisions about the type of production on a particular plot. There is also the
possibility to buy land, so they can expand their farms. Free plots belong to the Local Government,
which determines the sale conditions and taxation levels of specific farmers. Money acquired in this
way can be transferred in the form of subsidies to other players.
The Water Board main task is to build and maintain elements of the flood-protection infrastructure,
e.g., dykes and the water steering system. Dykes protect the valley from flooding, while the water
distribution system helps reduce flood losses or increases soil moisture in the valley during a drought.
The farmers’ financial performance depends on external factors, such as the precipitation, the water
levels in the river, the associated soil humidity, and the performance of different types of production
on the individual plots under different moisture regimes. Farmers can decide to set up crop cultivation
(with options to use high-yield grain), animal husbandry, orchards, and fish ponds, or they can decide
on the commercial use of pre-existing forests. Each production type is characterized by a different
resilience to environmental conditions as well as by losses caused by floods or excess irrigation from
the water steering system. Therefore, it is crucial to match each production type with the anticipated
conditions on the board. These are, in turn, the result of both external factors, independent of the
participants and the investments made by the Water Board. Additionally, all activities undertaken on
plots by farmers as well as the extent of the water steering system affect the biodiversity in the valley.
The intensification of production may damage the local ecosystem, which elevates crop sensitivity to
pest attacks and may cause additional losses.
There are also two other important institutional roles in the game, i.e., the Bank and the
Environmental Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). In the first case, as Banker, a player has
the option of granting loans to other entities in the valley, but he must also ensure that they are
recovered, including the interest charged. An environmental NGO has information on the impacts
of particular methods and types of production on biodiversity. This knowledge, together with the
possibility of making complaints about other players to the Central Government, which is represented
by the Moderator, can help protect the valley’s ecosystem.
The game presents two layers of complexity. One comes from the general complexity of the
simulation model, i.e., multiple interactions between environmental variables that affect production
within the valley and its economic condition. That, in turn, results in further investments that create
feedbacks, which can affect the environmental conditions. The second layer of complexity comes
from interactions among participants. Therefore, the process can be described as encompassing social
Water 2018, 10, 346 7 of 27
complexity. The economic dependencies between specific roles and the asymmetry of information
mean that communication and cooperation between and among players are the key aspects of the game.
Game facilitator applies the protocols of gameplay to impose restrictions on conversational possibilities
between individual participants. These restrictions are introduced to represent real-life problems
related to the dispersion of information. For example, representatives of more than three roles cannot
talk with each other at the same time. This simulates real-life challenges connected with engaging
other parties. As in real life, the only opportunity to assemble all inhabitants of the valley and reach a
broad agreement is through a so-called “community meeting.” Community meetings are convened
twice throughout the entire game, and representatives of all roles can participate. The way they are
carried and the topics discussed are regulated by the participants themselves. The overview of the
game physical model is attached in Appendix A.
The game was played over 7 rounds with the total time between 4 and 5 h, followed by 1–2 h
debriefing. It is a long and intensive game designed to allow players to immerse in its narrative and
for the social relations to develop within the game world (Figures 2 and 3).
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Figure 2. Social interactions in progress—Lords of the Valley (LOV) game workshop, Wrocław (photo
Anna Zemlak).
During the game, participants have to deal not only with both layers of complexity but also with
their own preconceptions and ideas about the effective management of the river valley. The underlying
model simulating environmental conditions (flood, drought) tests these ideas in terms of feasibility
and provides feedback about the consequences of their decisions. This process shows that some actions
may have unforeseen long-term consequ nces that can affect the environ nt of the entire valley.
Yet, for participants, the greatest challenge can be the social element within the simulation. Creating a
common understanding of the situation, let alone some management agreements, can be difficult when
all participants have their wn persp ctiv s on the problems being addressed, their own goals and
personal values, as well as different levels of access to the in-game information. The setting, as well as
the emphasis on the role-playing element of the game, enables each participant to observe how real-life
communication problems emerge and how they affect the outcomes. The safe environment of social
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simulation creates a “laboratory” where participants can not only learn about the challenges connected
with multi-party collaboration but also test their ideas and potential solutions in a safe environment.
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Figure 3. Financial performance in progress—LOV game workshop, Wroclaw (photo Anna Zemlak).
The game was played during workshops in three cities: Wrocław, Rzeszów, and Kraków.
The number of player participating in these workshop vari d from 15 to 25. Observations involved
11 observers trained in observation procedures (Appendix B), who were assigned to different roles;
one observer was assigned to follow general interactions at the game board. The results of the
observations include both quantitative and qualitative parts. However, due to the pilot study character
of this research, the quantitative results are not statistically significa t and are used here only for
testing the methodology. There were two observation protocols applied: one for the rounds of the
game and one for the community meetings (Appendixs C and D). They both contained multiple choice
as well as open-end d questions regarding communic tio and interactions etween t ams, sharing
information, leadership, conflicts, and overall group dynamics. Moreover, in the community meetings,
where representatives of all groups could participate, the observation protocol questions referred to
defining, understanding, and solving problems. Questions about exclusion (are some parties ignored
by others?), a common understanding of the problem, establishing agreed solution, and ground
rules are relevant only for community meetings. Results concerning internal dynamics come from
participants’ evaluation feedback, while the rest of the results come from observation protocols.
The questions in the observation protocol were related to specific categorizations (relevant for
the stated hypotheses) that were in turn narrowed down into specific variables. Observations were
recorded as data and transformed to indices (added) to measure variables that were later compared
between the cases (cities) to verify our hypotheses.
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For binary variables, observations were recorded as “yes” if that response was the majority, “no” if
that response predominated, and “hard to say” (HTS) if the distribution between the two was roughly
equal. In case of conflicts, answers indicate how many of the observers indicated “yes”, e.g., 7 from 10.
For the variables measured on ordinal scales, values presented in the table are the average of the scores.
In the case of stereotypes, the number indicates how many times they were noticed. Sharing
information specific to a player’s role was measured on a scale from—3 (No, actors actively refuse
to share information very much) to 3 (Yes, actors share information very much) with no neutral value.
Both competition and cooperation were measured on a scale from 3 (very much) to 1 (a little),
and observers were able to estimate both scales in each round. Common understanding of the
problem was measured on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 3 (very much). Establishing and agreed solution
is measured on a scale from 1 (Yes, and the solution is made explicit) to 4 (No, actors explicitly set individual
solutions). For all questions represented with ordinal scales, the values shown in the table are the
average of the scores.
Additionally, over the course of the game, participants completed surveys (3 times during the
game and before and after the game), intended to gather information on their subjective assessment
of cooperation and competition levels (Appendix E). In order to understand the time dynamics of
the sequence of game events round after round, both quantitative and qualitative data (including
participants direct quoted) have to be used jointly.
Recruitment for the games was open, advertised mostly in the academic community (mostly
students, doctoral students, and researchers) and resulted in a rather random group composition,
the impact of which is later discussed. Again, the study should be treated only as a pilot study.
3. Results
The results of observations carried out by observers during rounds and community meetings,
as well as from evaluation protocols, are presented in Tables 1–3.
Each single workshop (gameplay) created its own history of multi-party collaboration related
to managing natural resources in the face of threats. Multiple actors collaborated to address the
issues of water and soil management, nature preservation, land use, farming practices, introduction
of technology, innovation, and related problem domains. Participants in different cities had different
attitudes and different definitions of the problem domain. Each story was unique in terms of
participants decisions, results, and frames applied by participants about what happened in the valley
and why.
In Wrocław, participants initially focused on “deal-making” among themselves. They were mainly
engaged in bilateral conversations and agreements. Actors shared information specific for their roles
and goals; however, there was primarily “lots of talking between groups to figure out other team’s roles
and how to operate” (Quotes in italics come from observation protocols). In Rzeszów, there was almost
no communication at the beginning; some players openly refused to share or “held information close
and shared little with other teams.” In Kraków, actors were looking for general solutions. They “seemed
to be looking for the best solutions; not entirely self-focused.” In addition, there were some bilateral
conversations without open communication, but actors shared information, especially organizations
(i.e., Water Board, Bank, and NGO). These differences in attitudes at the beginning of the game
influenced further development of trajectories in different cities gameplays.
In Wrocław, leadership functions were rotating between selected teams (playing their roles): NGO,
Local Government (LG), and Water Board (WB). The participant playing the LG was perceived
as a natural leader. The participant playing the NGO was focused on both technical content
(problem-solving) and on group processes. The NGO emerged as a group facilitator and “was accepted
by all”. It was the only group (Wrocław) where the function of the facilitator was clearly identified and
enacted. The first round began in a climate of competition. However, better outcomes became possible
as other factors appeared: the emergence of a leader and facilitator, much smaller number of conflicts,
and sharing information during the first community meeting. At the time when the drought occurred,
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competition reappeared (the second Community Meeting) and even conflict (9/10), which clearly
shows the effect of the crisis. However, due to the collaborative practices established earlier as well as
effective leadership and facilitation, the group was able to recover from the crisis and, already in the 5th
round, information sharing was very intensive and cooperation more pronounced than competition.
This led to higher profits (visible in the game results). Although participants indicated a high level of
competition in their evaluation sheets, a summary of observational data of the participants provides
a broader view than the participants’ perceptions of competition and cooperation by revealing the
effect of a facilitator or leader and of sharing information on the outcomes. This also demonstrates that
conflict can be constructive when relational practices are positively established.
In Rzeszów, responsibility for the group was dispersed among different actors in each round.
There was no clear leader identified until the seventh round. As a consequence, there was “more chaos
than conflicts or cooperation.” Actors were “not sure who’s leading the circus.” Institutions like the
LG or the WB were recognized as leaders responsible for the valley, but “not all players paid attention
to them.”
In Kraków, there was no unambiguous leader. Rather, responsibility was dispersed. The LG and
the WB were recognized as leaders a few times, but they were mainly focused on technical content.
Cooperation was less intensive than in Wrocław and Rzeszów. There was much more competition and
rivalry, with obvious arguments and conflicts.
In each gameplay, stereotyping emerged over the course of interactions, and it was probably
transferred from actors’ experiences in the real world. Expressions of stereotyping affected mainly the
LG but also the NGO, WB, and sometimes (rarely) farmers:
”Government was initially distrusted by farmers.”
“Role of the government as a money source.”
“Thought that the government is greedy.”
“Farmers think government should subsidize poor farmers. NGO thinks farmers want
money for silly things. Farm 3 called NGO the “green guy.” NGO did not trust in the farmers’
abilities to change their land use, since they claimed at the meeting that they do not have the
knowledge. Farmers are poor and not environmentally friendly.”
“I don’t like the Bank, they are bloodsuckers ( . . . ) Those blood suckers, those bank people
. . . you like them?”
The data collected indicate that every single multi-party collaboration process was characterized
by different internal dynamics. Behaviors linked with some variables, such as exclusion or stereotyping,
were common in each gameplay, but there was significant variation with respect to most of the
variables observed. For example, some groups were poorly organized. Some had a history of conflict,
and there were disparities in power and resources. In addition, there were differences in access
to expertise and information. In general, the Wrocław group was better organized than the other
communities. In Wrocław, the leadership functions were shared successively between different roles
not only during game rounds but also during the community meetings. The final outcome was much
more satisfactory because parties were able to cooperate effectively, share information, and agree on
which solutions to implement. This is confirmed by both qualitative and quantitative data. In Rzeszów
and Kraków, information sharing was low, and there were fewer leadership attempts and no facilitation
function. Exclusion and conflicts occurred much more often than they did in Wrocław. Observations
from community meetings indicate that, in all cities, participants were not able to achieve a shared
understanding of the problem (nevertheless, Wrocław has the highest rate). This is often the case in the
real world, where stakeholders quickly jump to solutions without deeper reflection on how problem
perception differs among them.
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Leader Facilitator Rules Stereotypes Conflicts Competition Cooperation Internal Dynamics
Observation data Round 1 1.13 – – – YES HTS – 4 7/10 1.38 1.40 Competition
Evaluation data Round 1 – – – – – – – – – 2.00 1.83 Cooperation andcompetition
Observation data Round 2 1.22 – – – YES NO – 5 7/10 1.40 2.10 More cooperationthan competition
FLOOD
Observation data #1CM 1.22 5 1.33 1.22 YES YES NO 1 5/9 1.25 2.50 More cooperationthan competition
Evaluation data #1CM – – – – – – – – – 2.00 2.71 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 3 2.13 – – – YES NO – 4 2/10 1.40 2.14 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 4 1.83 – – – YES NO – 0 3/10 1.33 2.00 More cooperationthan competition
DROUGHT
Observation data #2CM 1.63 7 0.85 3 YES NO NO 4 9/10 2.38 1.60 Competition
Evaluation data #2CM – – – – – – – – – 2.00 2.14 Cooperation andcompetition
Observation data Round 5 2.33 – – – YES NO – 1 2/10 1.00 2.00 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 6 1.13 – – – YES NO – 1 4/10 2.00 2.14 More cooperationthan competition
FLOOD
Observation data Round 7 1.83 – – – HTS NO – 3 6/10 1.40 1.78 More cooperationthan competition
Evaluation data Round 7 – – – – – – – – – 2.00 1.86 Cooperation andcompetition
Evaluation data debriefing – – – – – – – – – 2.00 2.50 Cooperation andcompetition
Summary 14.44 23 45 23.53 28.71
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Leader Facilitator Rules Stereotypes Conflicts Competition Cooperation Internal Dynamics
Observation data Round 1 0.50 – – – NO NO – 4 6/11 1.60 1.60 Cooperation andcompetition
Evaluation data Round 1 – – – – – – – – – 2.00 2.14 Cooperation andcompetition
Observation data Round 2 0.78 – – – NO NO – 1 6/11 1.40 1.25 More cooperationthan competition
FLOOD
Observation data #1CM 0.60 8 1.28 2.71 NO NO NO 1 8/11 1.43 1.75 More cooperationthan competition
Evaluation data #1CM – – – – – – – – – 1.86 2.57 Cooperation andcompetition
Observation data Round 3 0.57 – – – YES NO – 2 4/10 1.50 1.67 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 4 1.00 – – – HTS NO – 1 3/10 2.00 1.80 Cooperation
DROUGHT
Observation data #2CM 0.83 8 1 2,4 NO NO NO 1 5/9 1.50 1.60 Cooperation andcompetition
Evaluation data #2CM – – – – – – – – – 1.43 2.29 Cooperation andcompetition
Observation data Round 5 1.33 – – – YES NO – 3 3/10 1.40 2.00 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 6 1.75 – – – YES NO – 3 5/10 1.67 2.33 Cooperation
FLOOD
Observation data Round 7 1.56 – – – YES NO – 1 2/10 1.50 2.13 More cooperationthan competition
Evaluation data Round 7 – – – – – – – – – 1.43 2.57 Cooperation andcompetition
Evaluation data debriefing – – – – – – – – – 1.67 2.43 More cooperationthan competition
Summary 8.92 17 42 22.38 28.13
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Leader Facilitator Rules Stereotypes Conflicts Competition Cooperation Internal Dynamics
Observation data Round 1 1.50 – – – YES NO – 4 3/11 1.50 1.67 Cooperation
Evaluation data Round 1 – – – – – – – – – 2.40 2.29 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 2 1.80 – – – YES NO – 0 2/11 1.17 2.00 Cooperation andcompetition
FLOOD
Observation data #1CM 1.80 9 1 3.12 NO NO NO 5 10/10 1.67 1.78 Cooperation andcompetition
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Observation data Round 3 1.36 – – – YES NO – 2 4/11 1.00 2.09 Cooperation
Observation data Round 4 0.67 – – – NO NO – 1 3/11 1.33 2.11 More cooperationthan competition
DROUGHT
Observation data #2CM 1.22 5 0.6 2.87 NO NO NO 4 10/10 2.11 1.86 Conflict
Evaluation data #2CM – – – – – – – – – 1.50 2.57 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 5 1.10 – – – HTS HTS – 0 6/11 1.60 1.50 More cooperationthan competition
Observation data Round 6 1.00 – – – YES NO – 1 6/11 1.40 2.14 More cooperationthan competition
FLOOD
Observation data Round 7 1.18 – – – YES NO – 2 8/10 1.00 1.55 More cooperationthan competition
Evaluation data Round 7 – – – – – – – – – 1.43 2.25 Cooperation andcompetition
Evaluation data debriefing – – – – – – – – – 1.50 2.29 More cooperationthan competition
Summary 11.63 19 52 21.36 28.25
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Besides observations, game decisions and results over the course of the gameplay were collected
to support the key hypotheses. Economic outcomes in the context of events in the river valley
ecosystem (flood and drought) are presented in Figure 4. The Wrocław group achieved better economic
results. Natural disasters (floods and droughts) occurred similarly in every scenario, but in Wrocław,
there was the greatest variability in outcomes related to events (i.e., floods and droughts); however,
this variability did not decrease accumulated profits. The most difficult economic situation was in
Kraków, where multi-party collaboration finished with conflict and economic bankruptcy. In Rzeszów,
a leader emerged in the seventh round, and they finished the game with better economic results
than those observed in Kraków. In Kraków, the greatest economic losses occurred due to drought,
while losses in Rzeszów were due to flooding. Regarding biodiversity, both Kraków and Rzeszów
resulted in a decreasing value, in contrast with Wrocław. Obviously, one can achieve high outputs
in both accumulated profit and biodiversity. This is because the underlying game model includes
feedback mechanisms that undermine economic outcomes in the long term when ecosystem services
are reduced due to negative environmental impacts.
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The results and their analysis presented above (Figure 4) provide t e basis for the assessment of
our hypoth ses. As indicated arlier in the article, verification of the stated ypotheses is beyond the
scope of this paper because our sample is too small. However, we can discuss the findings from our
case studies (gameplays in different cities) and note to what extent observed regularities contribute to
the stated hypotheses, which is necessary to verify our “research with gaming” approach. Subsequent
discussion of the pilot results should be seen in this light.
The Wrocław group achieved the best game outcomes both in terms of profits and biodiversity.
Table 4 presents observations indicating potential causes of this advantage, linked to specific
hypotheses. There is supporting evidence for Hypotheses 1, 2, and 4 but not for Hypothesis 3.
Table 4. Summary of observations high ighting the Wrocław group that achieved the best outcomes.
Hypothesis Summa y of Observations
Hypothesis 1. Groups th t allow/stimulate all me bers to
share information, express their understanding of the
problem, and build shared reality are better able to cope
with inherent ystem compl xity, and thus achieve better
content c mes.
The Wrocław group scored high on information
sharing, much better than ot er r ps.
The diffe ence between the groups with respect to
achieving the common problem d finition was
not pronounced.
Hypothesis 2. Having a leader (leaders) that is (are) both
process- and outcome- r ented facilitate the processes of
defining the proble an agreeing on o utions, ther fore
leading to a better content utc mes.
The leadership effect was observed throughout the
game in the Wrocław case. It emerged naturally
(NGO) or was discussed, agreed and transferred
between the roles. It allowed the whole group to get
through the crisis caused by floods and droughts.
Hypothesis 3. Stereotyping and/or lack of ground rules
facilitation of interactions makes conflict management more
difficult; as a result, it lowers the chance of developing
common solutions and negatively aff cts cont nt outcomes.
Wrocław case was the only one where facilitation
was present and this group was definitely better
organized than other cases; however, establishment
of the ground rules was not recorded. The intensity
of stereotyping was similar between the cases.
Hypothesis 4. The ability of the group to formulate and
agree on a common solution leads to better content outcomes.
An agreement on a common solution was reached
only in the Wrocław case.
Above we have presented all the steps necessary to analyze the results of the pilot study with
the game using data gathered with the observations protocol and participants’ surveys. These data
provide us with measures to draw the conclusions with respect to the stated research goal. Once we
have a larger dataset, we can test stated hypotheses statistically. The method is also rich enough for
qualitative research of smaller samples.
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4. Discussion and Conclusions
The LOV game was designed in such a way that relational practices were as important as
problem-solving aspects, and this is a novelty that combines game mechanics with role-playing
(identifying with and role taking in a party/organization from the game world). We aimed to provide a
space to observe how players behaved both in terms of the openness of interactions and the structured
observation protocol. Since this was a pilot study, the results are not statistically significant, and the results
are presented to demonstrate the method rather than to emphasize specific findings. The limitations
of this approach are similar to those in other experimental settings in social sciences and include the
artificiality effect, as well as the issues of psychological and process validity. The real-life resemblance
might be evaluated by participants themselves if participants were real stakeholders, and the artificiality
effect is difficult to avoid in laboratory experiments. On the other hand, during the game, we may ensure
a similar experimental environment for different groups in order to achieve a level of controlled variability
that is not possible in real-life situations. In order to make comparisons possible, a larger study with more
LOV sessions is necessary. Moreover, additional data about participants should be collected and included
in the analysis. For example, it is not possible to retroactively determine why the group in Wrocław was
better at embracing relational activities, especially leadership. In future research experiments, participants
should be examined with regard to their background, including domain knowledge, previous experience
in public policy making and serious gaming, and social or public activities in real life. The authors are
aware of their own cultural background, including the current emphasis on participatory approaches
in water governance research. In spite of our effort to create a neutral environment (a “sandbox”),
where participants could try different governance styles, there are unavoidable cultural biases that may
be present in game and research design. Different governance regimes can produce different outcomes in
different cultures [43,44]. In order to verify the stated hypotheses, this cultural background should also
be controlled in the experimental design, especially regarding the nature of relational activities under
observation, since this might differ depending on the cultural context. This issue might be the subject of
further research.
Indices constructed from observations can be developed with greater complexity or greater
specificity to identify relevant processes. For instance, conflicts may be focused on relations or tasks.
Several task conflicts can be a sign of diversity, so the balance of task conflict to relational conflict is
important. In this case, an index can be based on the ratio of task/relational conflict. In terms of ground
rules, they concerned procedural issues, task issues, and relationship issues. We usually observe
process interventions by some actors when they handle these issues, and gradually, these become
accepted (i.e., written) rules. Improved indices may take the nature of these interventions under
consideration, e.g., the effort to reframe the common ground to ensure that the concerns and interests
of all members are recognized in the problem formulation.
The application of the LOV game to do research with gaming described in this article is not
the only possible option for using this game. It can also be used to support real-world multi-party
processes related to the management of river valleys. Often the soft, relational activities do not receive
enough attention in the actual processes of formulating policy and making decisions. By participating
in a “social simulation” based on this game, stakeholders can become aware of the importance of
relational practices, and based on this experience, discuss how they can change their real world
relations, interactions, rules, or procedures.
By considering all limitations, we find the initial results obtained from this pilot study provide a
solid verification of the proposed research method used to study the effects of relational activities and
social learning for improving water governance.
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Appendix A. Overview of the Biophysical Model for the Lords of the Valley Game
The game uses a simple stylized model defining critical relationships and processes connected
to the small-scale management of the floodplain valley. The area is restricted to the segment of the
river with surrounding water infrastructure and local farms. Furthermore, all values presented to the
participants are treated as yearly averages (rainfall, soil moisture, the water level in the river, etc.).
What is more, due to the limited size of the modeled area and the scope of the game, biodiversity
is treated as an aggregated value representing average biodiversity within the valley. Introducing
such simplifications to the system was conscious design choice as limiting the physical complexity
of the simulation was required to conduct the workshop within the sensible timeframe along with
the debriefing. Figure A1 presents the general schematics of the system as well as the feedbacks
between simulation elements. The model transforms the participants’ decisions into the changes
of food production and of water infrastructures, such as dikes. It also combines the environmental
scenario (rainfall and the water level in the river) with choices made by the players (farmers and
the Water Board) to produce the concrete values of farmers’ production. Together the model and the
players’ decisions form an integrated social-ecological system with many interacting feedback loops.
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Appendix B. Instructions for Observers
Appendix B.1. Observation of Multi-Party Processes—Selection of Behaviors to be Recorded
• Communication between teams
• Conflicting goals and interests at different levels
• Deali g with un qual distribu ion of inf rmation
• Shared reality (common understanding of the problem/the system)
• Inter-group relations-conflict, cooperation, competition
• The role of trust (inter-group and intragroup)
• Setting interaction ground rules
• Commitments, responsibilities, control
• Learning about interdependence of actors
• Leadership style and facilitation
• Dealing with risk and uncertainty
Appendix B.2. Main Directives for the Observers
1. Stay “invisible”—do not talk to participants. In case they have questions—gently but firmly
redirect them to the main mo erator. Do not to express your feeling and opinions abou whatever
is going on—do not comment, nod, smile, etc. Do not laugh at their jokes.
2. Whatever you hear is confident during the game—you must not share any information with
other players.
3. Focus on relevant issues—do not listen/make notes if players are discussing topics unrelated to
the game. Respect their privacy!
4. Try not to distract players but make sure you can hear what they are saying.
5. Remember to write down interesting, vivid quotes, they will be useful also for debriefing.
Water 2018, 10, 346 19 of 27
6. After the game, go through your notes and make a short list of the 3 most important observations
you had—report them to Piotr.
Appendix B.3. If You are Assigned to Observe One Team in the Game
1. In case “your group” splits—follow one player for a while to find out what she/he is doing,
then try to find the second player and figure out what they are doing, etc. Your information will
not be complete but you need to know more or less about all players in your group.
2. During community meetings stay focused on “your group” and try to understand (and record)
how they relate to other groups. Be as specific as you can.
Appendix B.4. If You are Assigned to Observe the Whole Game at Once
1. Try to observe where people congregate, walk around the room, try to listen to their conversations,
and record who talked to whom, about what and how. You should visit all actors in each round
to see what they are up to—even if you cannot capture everything, it will give you a good
overall impression.
2. During the community meeting, try to observe group-level dynamics. Identify dominant actors
and observe how the groups decide the mode of discussion (process-related issues) and topics of
discussion (content-related issues).
Appendix B.5. Examples
Below, you will find examples of behaviors/quotes that correspond to each item of the observation
protocol. This is NOT a complete list, just a guide, to give you the sense of what we are looking for.
Participants’ behaviors are likely to be slightly different, so use your common sense to qualify them. For
each item of the observation protocol, we list several possible behaviors that we’ve see during our pilots
(with examples of what participants might actually say in italics)—please code this behavior based on
occurrence of any of these examples. For example, you code that participants share information if they
talk about anything related to the current situation in the valley with other role representatives.
Appendix B.5.1. Example 1
Actors share information specific for their roles
- Comments about the state of the situation in the Valley
# In this round we have no money for . . .
# We have cut all the trees now . . .
- Comments about changes
# We will have a problems with low level of water
# The prices of parcels will raise
Appendix B.5.2. Example 2
Participants declare adopting common norms/rules
- Announcing common rules
# Next round everybody in the group can only . . . (at least several participants nod or confirm verbally)
- Announcing sanctions for disobedience
# If anyone . . . , we will all sanction him/her
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Appendix B.5.3. Example 3
Can you identify a leader among participants in this round? Please write who it is. What is the
main focus of the leader?
- Who do you think is the most influential participant?
- Who can affect other participants’ decisions/behaviors?
- Who is asked for advice or guidance? (Technical content and problem solving)
- Who can stop fights and solve conflicts? (Interpersonal/group process)
Other interesting behaviors (please describe)
- Active resistance
# “I am not going to let you order me around.”
# “I don’t have to tell you how much I earned”
- Aggressive behaviors
# I don’t trust some of you, I think we should check each other.
# Visible conflicts—squabbling, yelling . . .
- Direct statements suggesting lack of trust
# I don’t trust that bastard, he always cheats.
# I want to see how much money you earned
- Nonverbal behaviors suggesting lack of trust (depending on the context)
# Remaining silent during the general discussion or when asked questions
# Trying to check the content of other peoples’ boxes
- Confusion about rules of the activity
# I don’t understand how . . . works.
# What happens if I . . . . . . ?
- And more . . .
Appendix C. Observation Protocol for the Game
1. How would you evaluate communication between teams regarding identifying, understanding,
and solving the problem of the Valley?
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
Actors are mainly engaged in bilateral
conversations and agreements
Actors are looking for solutions that will work for
the whole group
It’s hard to say







• It’s hard to say
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3. Do actors share information specific for their roles?
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
No, actors actively refuse to share information Yes, actors share information It’s hard to say
4. Under what conditions and for whom do they provide the information? (please describe below)
5. How would you evaluate interactions between teams? (you may tick on both sides of the scale)
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
Competition/rivalry/conflicts Cooperation It’s hard to say
6. Can you observe conflicts?
• Yes, there are conflicts (please describe how they are dealt with)
• No, there seems to be no conflict
7. Can you observe stereotyping?
• Yes, certain actors get stereotyped (please describe)
• No, there seems to be no use of stereotypes
8. Is there a clear leader?












No, there seems to be no leader.
9. What is the main focus of the leader?
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) # #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
Technical content and problem solving Both equally Interpersonal/group process It’s hard to say
10. Describe the internal dynamics of the team you are observing—how are they making decisions,
sharing information, and delegating tasks?
11. How were the actors dealing with uncertainty and risk?
12. Other interesting observations
Appendix D. Observation Protocol for Community Meetings
1. Can all actors give their view on the definition of the problem of the Valley?
• Yes, they all said how they see the problem.
• Most actors are able to say how they see the problem but some actors are ignored.
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• Discussion is dominated by one or few actors, and many actors are ignored.
• There is no discussion about the problem of the Valley.







3. Do the actors seem to achieve common understanding of the problem?
#(not at all) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #It’s hard to say
4. Did the group establish an agreed solution?
• Yes, and the solution is made explicit (please write it down below)
• Vaguely yes, the solution is implicit
• Vaguely no, it seems that actors have different solutions and these solutions are
not articulated
• No, actors explicitly set individual solutions (please write them down below)
• It’s hard to say







• It’s hard to say
6. Do actors share information specific for their roles?
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
No, actors refuse to share information Yes, actors share information It’s hard to say
7. How would you evaluate group-level interactions? (you may tick on both sides of the scale)
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
Competition/rivalry/conflicts Cooperation It’s hard to say
8. Can you observe conflicts?
• Yes, there are conflicts (please describe how they are dealt with)
• No, there seems to be no conflict
9. Can you observe stereotyping?
• Yes, certain actors get stereotyped (please describe)
• No, there seems to be no use of stereotypes
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10. Is there a leader?












No, there seems to be no leader.
11. What is the main focus of the leader?
#(very much) #(moderately) #(a little) # #(a little) #(moderately) #(very much) #
Technical content and problem solving Both equally Interpersonal/group process It’s hard to say
12. Are there any ground rules created by the group? (multiple choice possible)
• rules about making decisions
• rules about dealing with conflict
• rules about sharing information
• rules about mutual respect
• other rules (please describe)
• the group does not have any rules established
Other interesting observations
Appendix E. Evaluation Questionnaires for Farmers
FARMER No . . . . . . .
Beginning of Round 1
Please recall the moment AT THE BEGINNING OF THE GAME, JUST BEFORE ROUND 1.
How did you expect your interactions to develop with the following teams?
Local Government a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Water Board a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
ecoNGO a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Bank a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Other farmers a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
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Additional Comments:
The whole valley community a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
After community meeting #1
Please recall the moment IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FIRST COMMUNITY MEETING.
Considering your experience of the previous rounds and what happened at the first community
meeting, how did you evaluate your interactions with the following teams at that moment?
Local Government a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Water Board a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
ecoNGO a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Bank a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition




The whole valley community a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
After community meeting #2
Please recall the moment IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SECOND COMMUNITY MEETING.
Considering your experience of the previous rounds and what happened at the first community
meeting, how did you evaluate your interactions with the following teams at that moment?
Local Government a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Water Board a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
ecoNGO a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Bank a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Other farmers a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
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Additional Comments:
The whole valley community a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Immediately after the last round
Considering your experience during the game, how do you evaluate your interactions with the
following teams?
Local Government a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Water Board a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
ecoNGO a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Bank a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition








Considering all you have heard and experienced during the debriefing session, how do you
evaluate your interactions with the following teams?
Local Government a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Water Board a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
ecoNGO a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
Bank a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition




The whole valley community a little moderately very much hard to say
cooperation
competition
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